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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
KENNETH JAMES MORRELL, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent. 
Supreme Court 
Case No. 
Court of Appeals 
Case No. 890031-CA 
Priority No. 13 
QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Mr. Morrell was convicted of robbing Matthew Moor, a pizza 
delivery person, in September of 1988. Mr. Morrell admitted that it 
was his intent to take money from Mr. Moor, and his actions were 
reflective of that intent. As supposed proof of Mr. Moor's intent, 
the Court of Appeals condoned the admission of evidence of 
Mr. Morrell's robbery of a pizza delivery person in June of 1988 
(hereinafter referred to as "the extrinsic robbery"). The following 
question is presented for this Court's consideration: 
Under Utah Rule of Evidence 404(b), is 
evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts 
admissible to show "intent" when the requisite 
level of criminal intent is merely a formal issue 
that may be inferred from the physical actions of 
the defendant? 
In the event that this Court allows briefing on the merits, 
Mr. Morrell also seeks permission to address three related issues 
that were raised before the Court of Appeals, but omitted from the 
opinion, concerning (1) the failure of the extrinsic robbery to 
prove Mr. Morrell's intent some three months after the extrinsic 
robbery; (2) the impact of instructing the jury that the evidence of 
the extrinsic robbery could be used for impeachment and as "proof of 
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, 
or absence of mistake or accident"; and (3) the similarity of the 
extrinsic robbery and the crime charged, resulting in the heightened 
likelihood that the jurors convicted Mr. Morrell on the basis of his 
perceived propensity to rob pizza delivery people. Mr. Morrell 
notifies this Court of these related issues in an effort to preserve 
his arguments for briefing on the merits, but does not contend that 
these related issues justify issuance of a writ. 
OPINION AND ORDER OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
The Court of Appeals' decision and order denying rehearing 
are reproduced in Appendix 1. 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
The Court of Appeals' decision was filed on November 30, 
1990. The Court of Appeals' order denying rehearing was signed on 
January 15, 1991. 
This Court's statutory jurisdiction over this petition for 
certiorari is provided by Utah Code Ann. section 78-2-2(5). 
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CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISION 
Utah Rule of Evidence 404 
(a) Character evidence generally. Evidence 
of a person's character or a trait of his 
character is not admissible for the purpose of 
proving that he acted in conformity therewith on 
a particular occasion, except: 
(1) Character of accused. Evidence of 
a pertinent trait of his character offered 
by an accused, or by the prosecution to 
rebut the same; 
(2) Character of victim. Evidence of a 
pertinent trait of character of the victim 
of the crime offered by the prosecution in a 
homicide case to rebut evidence that the 
victim was the first aggressor; 
(3) Character of witness. Evidence of 
the character of a witness, as provided in 
Rules 607, 608, and 609. 
(b) Other crime, wrongs, or acts. Evidence 
of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible 
to prove the character of a person in order to 
show that he acted in conformity therewith. It 
may, however, be admissible for other purposes, 
such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, 
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or 
absence of mistake or accident. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
On December 2, 1988, Mr. Morrell was convicted by a jury 
robbery, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
section 76-6-301 (R. 118). The trial court sentenced Mr. Morrell 
a term of one to fifteen years in the Utah State Prison (R. 122). 
The Court of Appeals affirmed Mr. Morrell's conviction in 
decision filed on November 30, 1990, and denied rehearing of the 
case in an order filed on January 15, 1991. 
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B. FACTS 
Mr. Morrell was tried for aggravated robbery of Matthew 
Moor, a pizza delivery person, and convicted of simple robbery 
(R. 23-24, 30; 118)A 
Mr. Morrell admitted the intent element of robbery2—it was 
his conscious objective and desire to take money from Mr. Moor 
(because Mr. Moor owed it to him from a previous illegal drug 
transaction) (T.2 25-27). Under either version of facts, that of 
Mr. Moor or that of Mr. Morrell, the facts reflect Mr. Morrell's 
1. Utah Code Ann. section 76-6-301 defines robbery as 
follows: 
(1) Robbery is the unlawful and intentional 
taking of personal property in the possession of 
another from his person, or immediate presence, 
against his will, accomplished by means of force 
or fear. 
Utah Code Ann. section 76-6-302 defines aggravated robbery 
as follows: 
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if 
in the course of committing robbery, he: 
(a) uses or threatens to use a 
dangerous weapon as defined in Section 
76-1-601; or 
(b) causes serious bodily injury upon 
another. 
2. Utah Code Ann. section 76-2-103 defines the requisite 
level of intent for robbery as follows: 
A person engages in conduct: 
(1) Intentionally, or with intent or 
willfully with respect to the nature of his 
conduct or to a result of his conduct, when it is 
his conscious objective or desire to engage in 
the conduct or cause the result. 
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conscious objective and desire to take money from Mr. Moor.3 
Over Mr. Morrell's objection, evidence was admitted 
concerning Mr. Morrell's guilty plea to a charge involving the 
robbery of a pizza delivery person some three months prior to 
Mr. Morrell's encounter with Mr. Moor (T.2 73-80). At trial, the 
prosecutor argued that the evidence of the extrinsic robbery was 
admissible to show Mr. Morrell's intent, and explicitly disavowed 
the argument that the extrinsic robbery was admissible to show modus 
operandi (M.H. 17-21, 27). The trial court indicated that the 
evidence of the extrinsic robbery was admissible to show intent, 
plan, preparation, and modus operandi (M.H. 29, T. 100), and also 
ruled the guilty plea admissible under Utah Rule of Evidence 
609(a)(2) as proof of a crime of dishonesty (M.H. 4-5). The jury 
was instructed that the evidence of the extrinsic robbery could be 
used for impeachment purposes and to show "proof of motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or 
absence of mistake or accident." (R. 98-99). 
On appeal, the Utah Court of Appeals upheld the admission 
of the evidence of the extrinsic robbery under Utah Rule of Evidence 
3. According to Mr. Moor, Mr. Morrell held Mr. Moor at 
knifepoint, informed him that he was being robbed, and forced 
Mr. Moor to drive to several locations in Salt Lake City because the 
amount of money Mr. Moor had on his person did not satisfy 
Mr. Morrell (T. 12-68). 
According to Mr. Morrell, Mr. Morrell grabbed Mr. Moor 
during their initial encounter, but did not use a weapon or threats 
to collect the debt because Mr. Moor acknowledged the debt and took 
the initiative in driving Mr Morrell to several locations with the 
stated purpose of procuring money to repay Mr. Morrell (T.2 20-66). 
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404(b) as proof of Mr. Morrell's intent, without any accounting for 
the breadth of the jury instruction on the permissible use of the 
evidence. The court stated, 
Defendant directly challenged the element of 
intent. He claimed he was only trying to collect 
a debt through somewhat insistent, but not 
unlawful, means. Defendant was being tried for 
aggravated robbery, which is "the unlawful and 
intentional taking of personal property" from 
another, "against his will," by threat or use of 
"a dangerous weapon." Utah Code Ann. §§ 
76-6-301(1), -302(l)(a) (1990). The only two 
controverted elements of the charge were the use 
of a weapon and defendant's intent. Therefore, 
it was critical for the state that it discredit 
defendant's claim of a coincidental encounter 
with Mr. Moor. Admission of prior bad acts is 
proper when it tends to prove a contested 
material element of the crime charged. Evidence 
of the prior robbery was highly probative of 
defendant's intent in the present case. 
Morrell. 149 Utah Adv. Rep. 26, 27-28 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)(footnote 
and citations omitted). 
In analyzing the admission of the evidence of the extrinsic 
robbery under Utah Rule of Evidence 403,4 the Court of Appeals did 
not address the concern that the similarity of the extrinsic robbery 
and the crime charged was likely to result in a verdict based on 
perceptions of Mr. Morrell's propensity to rob pizza delivery 
people. The court stated, 
4. The rule provides, 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded 
if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, 
or by considerations of undue delay, waste of 
time, or needless presentation of cumulative 
evidence. 
- 6 -
Testimony concerning the prior robbery was 
the only evidence, other than defendant's and 
Moor's conflicting testimony, bearing on whether 
defendant's intent was to rob Moor or merely to 
secure payment of money defendant believed he was 
owed. The testimony, then, was clearly 
prejudicial to defendant. It was however, 
extremely probative of defendant's intent during 
the incident with Moor. The two robberies for 
which defendant was charged occurred within 
months of each other. Each manifested an almost 
identical factual pattern. There was strong 
evidence of defendant's guilt in the prior 
robbery in view of competent eyewitness testimony 
from the victim in that case. The state had a 
great need to present this evidence to 
demonstrate intent; no effective alternative 
proof was available. 
Morrell, 149 Utah Adv. Rep. at 28. 
In a petition for rehearing, Mr. Morrell argued that the 
Court of Appeals was incorrect in its conclusion that intent was at 
issue and justified the admission of the extrinsic robbery.5 
He also asked the Court of Appeals to dispose of the 
concern that in light of the similarity of the extrinsic robbery and 
the crime charged, and in light of the confusing jury 
5. Petition for rehearing at 2-4, relying on Graham, 
Handbook of Federal Evidence, section 404.5, at page 203 footnote 8 
("Slough, 'Relevance Unraveled,' 6 Kan. L.Rev. 28, 48 (1957), 
describes criminal intent 'as that state of mind which negatives 
accident, inadvertence or casualty.'"); McCormick on Evidence, 
section 190, 1987 supplement at 57 ("If the defendant does not deny 
that his acts were deliberate, then the prosecution may not 
introduce the evidence^merely to show that the acts were not 
accidental."); United States v. Shackleford. 738 F.2d 776, 781 (7th 
Cir. 1984)(under federal rule of evidence, evidence of other crimes 
are not admissible to prove intent when intent is merely a formal 
issue that may be inferred from defendants' actions). For cases 
demonstrating that intent may be inferred from acts, see e.g. 
State v. Kazda, 302 P.2d 486, 488 (Utah 1964)(intent to commit 
aggravated robbery inferred from facts of case); State v. Guiterrez, 
714 P.2d 295 (Utah 1986)(per curiam)(same). 
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instruction, it was practically guaranteed that th€> jury convicted 
Mr. Morrell on the basis of his perceived propensity to rob pizza 
delivery people.6 
The Court of Appeals denied rehearing. 
REASON WHY QUESTION PRESENTED JUSTIFIES ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT 
As noted above, the question before this Court in this 
petition is, 
Under Utah Rule of Evidence 404(b), is 
evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts 
admissible to show "intent" when the requisite 
level of criminal intent is merely a formal issue 
that may be inferred from the physical actions of 
the defendant? 
The Court of Appeals' broad interpretation of the intent 
exception to Rule 404(b) is a precedent that portends to defeat the 
well established practice of this Court to carefully limit the 
admission of evidence of other crimes. As this Court has 
recognized, evidence of other crimes is presumptively prejudicial.7 
6. Petition for rehearing at 5 n. 2, relying on United 
States v. Shackleford, 738 F.2d 776, 780 (7th Cir. 1984)("The jury 
was left to decide what the terms 'motive,' 'intent,' 'plan,' etc. 
might mean in the context of this case and whether the evidence fit 
into any one of these categories. The jury would have to study 
Weinstein's chapter on 'Relevancy and Its Limits' in order to 
accomplish that assignment properly."); and Graham, Handbook of 
Federal Evidence, section 404.5, page 223 and n. 23 (explaining that 
jurors are more likely to convict on the basis of a defendant's 
perceived propensity toward criminal action, rather than on the 
evidence relevant to the charge in question, in cases in which 
extrinsic crimes greatly resemble crimes charged). 
7. State v. Saunders. 699 P.2d 738, 741 (Utah 1985). 
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Under Utah law, intent is an element of every crime,8 and this 
Court's opinions interpreting the intent exception to Rule of 
Evidence 404(b), accordingly, have been quite narrow.9 
This Court should grant the writ to maintain the integrity 
of Utah Rule of Evidence 404(b). "To allow intent automatically to 
become an issue in that class of cases in which intent is inferable 
from the nature of the act charged would create an exception that 
'would virtually swallow the rule against admission of evidence or 
prior misconduct.'" United States v. Shackleford. 738 F.2d 776, 781 
(7th Cir. 1984), quoting United States v. Ring, 513 F.2d 1001, 1009 
(6th Cir. 1975). 
8. Utah Code Ann. section 76-1-501 explains this general 
principle of criminal law: 
(1) A defendant in a criminal proceeding is 
presumed to be innocent until each element of the 
offense charged against him is proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt. In absence of such proof, the 
defendant shall be acquitted. 
(2) As used in this part the words "element 
of the offense" mean: 
(a) The conduct, attendant 
circumstances, or results of conduct 
proscribed, prohibited, or forbidden in the 
definition of the offense; 
(b) The culpable mental state required. 
9. E.g. State v. Shickles. 760 P.2d 291, 295-296 (Utah 
1988)(evidence of extrinsic crimes admissible to show specific 
intent to kidnap in context of contradictory evidence on intent 
issue; defendant entitled to clear jury instruction on limited use 
of evidence); State v. Featherston. 781 P.2d 424, 426-428 (Utah 
1989)(defendant's sexual conduct seven or eight hours prior to 
sexual assault was not admissible to show defendant's intent; even 
if the evidence of extrinsic wrongdoings were probative, prejudicial 
impact required exclusion). 
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CONCLUSION 
Mr. Morrell requests that this Court grant a writ of 
certiorari on question 1. 
Respectfully submitted this j / day of February, 
1991. 
ELIZABETH HdLj3R0C 
Attorney foi| $lr. Morrell 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, ELIZABETH HOLBROOK, hereby certify that ten copies of 
the foregoing will be delivered to the Utah Supreme Court, 332 State 
Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 and four copies to the Attorney 
General's Office, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, 
this I j day of February, 1991. 
DELIVERED by 
of February, 1991. 
this day 
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APPENDIX 1 
39 (JV88). >^ee aiso p*vie, IVM<U>ICM* *HU magis-
trates in the Federal Courts, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 
779, 796-97 (1975). Also, unless a reference 
to a magistrate. expressly states otherwise, 
magistrates appointed to act as masters are 
specifically excepted from the requirements of 
Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 53(0- In my: view, it 
is a mistake for this Court to look to the tre-
atment of federal magistrates for purposes of 
analogy to the treatment of masters under 
Rule 53. 
HOWE, Associate Chief Justice: (Concurring 
and Dissenting) 
J concur in the majority opinion, except that 
I would remand the case to the trial court for 
final determination of the amount of fees to 
be awarded. Since we have determined that the 
trial court erroneously relied on the flawed 
master's report, the proper procedure in my 
opinion is to remand the issue back to the trial 
court for reconsideration and final determin-
ation without regard to the report. I believe 
that it is premature for us to accept and 
approve the stipulation without first allowing 
it to be presented to and considered by the 
trial court. 
Cite as 
149 Utah Adv. Rep. 26 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
The STATE of Utah, 
* Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Kenneth James MORRELL, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 890031-CA 
FILED: November 30, 1990 
Third District, Salt Lake County 
The Honorable Leonard H. Russon 
ATTORNEYS: 
Debra K. Loy and Elizabeth Holbrook, Salt 
Lake City, for Appellant 
R. Paul Van Dam and Christine F. Soltis, Salt 
Lake City, for Appellee 
Before Judges Bench, Billings, and Orme. 
ORME, Judge: 
Defendant Morrell appeals his conviction 
for robbery, a second degree felony in viola-
tion of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-301 (1990). 
Except as otherwise noted, we set forth the 
facts in the manner most consistent with the 
jury's verdict. On September 4, 1988, 
Matthew Moor, a pizza delivery driver empl-
oyed by Ambassador^Pizza in Salt Lake City, 
was robbed while attempting to deliver a pizza 
ordered by telephone. As Moor drove to the 
neighborhood of 813 Genessee Streeu the 
address to which he was to deliver the pizza, 
Moor saw defendant Kenneth Morrell standing 
on a corner and asked him for directions. 
Moor then drove a very short distance to 813 
Genessee Street and discovered that the house 
was dark and apparently unoccupied. As 
Moor returned to his car, defendant approa-
ched him and asked to purchase the pizza. 
Moor offered to sell defendant the pizza for 
five dollars. Defendant pressed an object to 
Moor's neck and told Moor that he was being 
robbed. 
Defendant got into the car with Moor and 
demanded money from him. When Moor did 
not produce the amount of money that defe-
ndant wanted, defendant had Moor drive to 
another location in order to search the car for 
more money. He found none. Defendant then 
ordered Moor to drive to a house in the 
avenues area in order to set up a robbery of a 
Domino's Pizza delivery driver. Upon telep-
honing, defendant found Domino's Pizza 
closed and told Moor that he had better 
produce more money. Moor suggested that 
they drive to his friend's house to get money, 
and defendant agreed. 
Moor drove to the home of Ivan Ilov and 
sat in the driveway honking the horn. When 
Ilov approached the car he discerned that 
Moor was in some sort of trouble. Moor 
asked Ilov for money, stating that defendant 
was holding a knife to him. Ilov broke 
through the window and attempted to restrain 
defendant. Defendant escaped and Moor and 
Ilov gave chase. As Moor reached him, defe-
ndant hit Moor, breaking Moor's nose. Moor 
caught defendant again and Ilov assisted in 
restraining him. A passing taxi driver summ-
oned police. 
When the police arrived, one officer took 
custody of defendant from Ilov and asked 
defendant: "What's going on?" Defendant did 
not respond. Defendant was arrested after 
Moor was interviewed by another officer and 
the officers concluded that a robbery had 
occurred. 
At trial, defendant testified he saw Moor 
driving in defendant's neighborhood and 
recognized both Moor and his car. He stated 
that he had sold some marijuana to Moor at a 
party for which Moor still owed money to 
defendant. Defendant claimed that when Moor 
pulled over to ask street directions of defen-
Moor about the money owed for the marij-
uana. Moor did not have enough money to 
satisfy the debt and suggested that they go 
elsewhere to get more money. Eventually, 
defendant and Moor arrived at Ilov's home, 
where the defendant's account of the events 
largely corresponds with Moor's. 
The trial court precluded defense counsel 
from cross-examining Moor concerning his 
drug and alcohol use, and any related possible 
effect on his ability to recall prior encounters 
with defendant which may have supported 
defendant's claim of a drug sales debt. The 
court also allowed testimony by a police det-
ective that the telephone used to place the 
pizza order incident to the robbery in this 
case, like others which had occurred, was not 
located at the address stated by the person 
placing the order. 
The jury convicted defendant of robbery. 
On appeal, defendant raises several evidentiary 
issues. First, defendant attacks the trial 
court's admission of evidence of his guilty 
plea to a prior robbery and of the facts und-
erlying that plea. Second, defendant challenges 
the admission of evidence of his silence in 
response to the initial question put to him by 
police. Third, defendant claims that the trial 
court improperly limited cross-examination 
of the robbery victim1 and in admitting 
hearsay testimony by a police officer. 
EVIDENCE OF THE PRIOR ROBBERY 
Defendant challenges, under rule 609(a)(2) 
of the Utah Rules of Evidence, the admission 
of his guilty plea to a similar robbery of a 
pizza deliveryman. Defendant claims that a 
guilty plea is not equivalent to a conviction 
and that robbery is not a crime of dishonesty 
automatically admissible under Rule 609(a)(2). 
We review the trial court's evidentiary rulings 
only for an abuse of discretion which results 
in prejudice to substantial rights. State v. 
Brown, 111 P.2d 1093, 1094 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989); State v. Jamison, 767 P.2d 134, 137 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989). The state concedes that 
admission of the guilty plea to theft, on the 
ground that theft may automatically be treated 
as a crime of dishonesty, was improper.2 We 
agree. 
Rule 609(a)(2) provides that evidence of 
conviction for any crime involving dishonesty 
or a false statement is admissible to attack the 
credibility of a witness. The focus of the rule 
concerns impeachment based on the probabi-
lity that a particular witness may not be telling 
the truth as evidenced by prior acts of disho-
nesty on the part of that witness. Any act 
done with knowledge of its unlawfulness inv-
olves a measure of dishonesty as commonly 
defined. Nonetheless, Rule 609(a)(2) was 
HraffpH tn rpctrirt fliitnmatir aHmissihilitv in 
mony. See State v. Morehouse, 748 P.2d 217, 
222 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (Jackson, J., diss-
enting) (citing legislative history of subsection 
609(a)(2)). 
While some dispute exists as to whether 
robbery should be classified as a crime'of 
dishonesty, see State v. Wight, 765 P.2d 12, 
21-22 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (Garff, J., con-
curring), it is established under Utah law that 
the crime of robbery does not automatically 
qualify for admission under Rule 609(a)(2). 
State v. Bruce, 779 P.2d 646, 656 (Utah 1989) 
(robbery conviction not automatically admis-
sible); State v. Brown, 111 P.2d 1093, 1094-
95 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (conviction of theft 
crimes not automatically admissible); State v. 
Wight, 765 P.2d at 17-19 (aggravated 
robbery conviction not automatically admiss-
ible). 
The trial court made no inquiry into the 
facts underlying defendant's guilty plea in its 
consideration of admissibility. Therefore, 
nothing in the record demonstrates a consid-
eration of facts relative to defendant's prior 
theft to determine their relevance, if any, to 
defendant's propensity to tell the truth.3 See 
Wight, 765 P.2d at 18 (under 609(a)(2), crime 
of robbery may be admissible if underlying 
facts demonstrate impairment of credibility). 
Although conceding the guilty plea , could 
not properly come in under Rule 609, the state 
claims we should nonetheless affirm because 
evidence of the facts underlying the. prior 
robbery charge, offered through the testimony 
of the victim in that case, was admissible 
under Rule 404(b) as probative of defendant's 
intent to rob Moor, and in refutation of def-
endant's claim that he was merely attempting 
collection of a debt. Rule 404(b) establishes 
certain circumstances in which evidence of 
other crimes may be admitted: 
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or 
acts is not admissible to prove the, 
character of a person in order to, 
show that he acted in conformity^ 
therewith. It may, however, be 
admissible for other purposes, such 
as proof of motive, opportunity, 
intent, preparation, plan, knowl-. 
edge, identity, or absence of, 
mistake or accident. 
Utah R. Evid. 404(b). 
• Defendant directly challenged the element of 
intent. He claimed he was only trying-to 
collect a debt through somewhat insistent* trot 
not unlawful, means; Defendant. was being 
tried for aggravated robbery, which isr "the 
unlawful and intentional taking of personal 
property" from another, "against his will,* by 
threat or use of "a dangerous weapon." Utah 
Code Ann. §§76-6-301(1). -302(l)(a) 
defendant's intent. Ifteretore, it was critical 
for the state that it discredit defendant's claim 
of a coincidental encounter with Moor. 
Admission of prior bad acts is proper when it 
tends to prove a contested material element of 
the crime charged. State v^.Featherson, 781 
P^d 424, 426 (Utah 1989); Store v. Shaffer, 
725 P.2d 1301, 1307 (Utah 1986). Evidence of 
the;prior robbery was highly probative, of 
defendant's intent in the present case.* , * 
''Even .though the. evidence -was otherwise 
admissible under Rule 404(b), we must neve-
rtheless determine whether the prejudicial 
nature of the evidence substantially oversha-
dowed its probative value under Utah Rule of 
Evidence 403. See State v. Gotschall, 782 P.2d 
459, 462 (Utah 1989). This is a fact-intensive 
question, delegated by the Rules of Evidence 
to the discretion of the trial court. We there-
fore review determinations of admissibility 
under Rule 403 only for abuse of discretion. Id. 
Only if discretion is abused and prejudice 
results will the court's mistake constitute 
reversible error. Id. 
In State v. Stickles, 760 P.2d 291 (Utah 
1988), the Utah Supreme Court listed several 
factors which are helpful in balancing proba-
tiveness and prejudice. 
In deciding whether the danger of 
unfair prejudice and the like subs-
tantially outweighs the incremental 
probative value, a variety of matters 
must be considered, including the 
strength of the evidence as to the 
commission of the other crime, the 
similarities between the crimes, the 
interval of time that has elapsed 
between the crimes, the need for the 
evidence, the efficacy of alternative 
proof and the degree to which the 
evidence probably will rouse the 
jury to overmastering hostility. 
Id. at 295-96 (quoting E. Cleary, McCormick 
on Evidence, §190 at 565 (3d ed. 1984)). The 
record reflects that counsel for defendant and 
the state presented arguments based on these 
factors. The trial court then ruled that the 
evidence was admissible. 
Testimony concerning the prior robbery was 
the only evidence, other than defendant's and 
Moor's conflicting testimoriy, bearing on 
whether defendant's intent was to rob Moor 
or merely to secure payment of money defe-
ndant believed he was owed. The testimony, 
then, was clearly prejudicial to defendant. It 
was, however, extremely probative of defen-
dant's intent during the incident with Moor. 
The two robberies for which defendant was 
charged occurred within months of each other. 
Each manifested an almost identical factual 
Dattern. There was strong evidence of defen-
lO present nil* cv iutuct ivs uvuiuuauaic UUCHU 
no effective alternative proof was available* Cf 
Shickles, 760 P.2d at 296 (even' where 
"other evidences of defendant's intent*/arc 
introduced, "the use of ;.. other-crimes.qrtt 
dence" is "not necessarily". preduded)otWc 
cannot say that the trial court abused :its^ dlj£ 
cretion in weighing these factors and detenu? 
ining that the probative value substantially 
outweighed the prejudicial effect. It was th£ 
refore not incumbent, upon the court.^to 
exclude the evidence under Rule 403. Because 
admission of the evidence was proper, under 
Rule 404(b), and not barred by Rule 403t any 
error in admission of the guilty plea under 
Rule 609(a)(2) is harmless. 
EVIDENCE OF PRE-AfZRAMM SILENCE] 
During the cross-examination of one 
officer, the prosecution elicited testimony of 
defendant's silence when he was asked by 
another police officer what was happening. 
This question was asked immediately after the 
arrival of the officers, who took control of 
defendant from Ilov. No Miranda warning 
had been given, and defendant claims for this 
reason that the court erred in allowing impr-
oper comment on his silence. The state asserts 
that the testimony was proper as demonstra-
ting intent to rob Moor since defendant did 
not exculpate himself by stating that he was 
merely endeavoring to collect a debt. 
In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 
(1966), the Supreme Court held that the pro-
secution is barred from using statements ste-
mming from custodial interrogation of a def-
endant unless the defendant had been info-
rmed of the right to remain silent, the right to 
counsel, the right to appointed counsel if 
indigent, and that any statement may be used 
against the defendant. Not all police inquiry is 
made in the context of custodial interrogation. 
On the contrary, 
[t]he Utah Supreme Court has ide-
ntified several key factors to cons-
ider in order to determine when a 
defendant 
who has not been formally 
arrested is in custody. They -
are: (1) the site of interroga-
tion; (2) whether the investi-
ga t ion focused on the 
accused; (3) whether the 
objective indicia of arrest 
were present; and (4) the 
length and form of interrog-
ation. 
Salt Lake City v. Carner, 664 P.2d 
- 1168, 1171 (Utah 1983). Another 
factor which we find pertinent to 
our analysis was recognized by our 
fWann counterpart in State v. 
place of interrogation freely and 
willingly. Id. at 1212. 
State v. Sampson, 143 Utah Adv. Rep. 12, 15 
(Ct. App. 1990). 
Treating these factors in order, the follo-
wing conclusions emerge. First, the site of 
interrogation was a public parking lot which, 
unlike interrogation at the police station, see id., 
does not suggest custody. Second, the 
investigation had not yet focused on defen-
dant. When the officers arrived at the scene 
and observed defendant restrained by Ilov, 
they knew nothing more than that an alterca-
tion had been reported, and that a pizza driver 
was possibly missing in the same general vici-
nity. The officers had no reason to know or 
suspect that the two reports were connected. 
Nor did they know the reason for the alterc-
ation and which party to the altercation, if 
any, was the culprit. At the time of the ques-
tion the officers did not know if a crime had 
been committed, nor had any investigation yet 
focused on defendant. Contemporaneously 
with the question, but some distance from 
where it was asked, Moor exited a nearby 
restaurant, where he had gone to attend to his 
broken nose, and spoke with another officer 
who determined that Moor was the victim of a 
robbery and defendant was the apparent per-
petrator. Nothing more was asked of defen-
dant from that time. To that point, defen-
dant's encounter with the police constituted 
nothing more than a general investigation to 
determine whether a crime had even been 
committed. Third, while it is apparent that 
defendant had been momentarily restrained by 
police officers when the question was put to 
him, other objective indicia of arrest were 
lacking. Defendant was not handcuffed, 
placed in a police vehicle, or told he was 
under arrest. Fourth, the length of interroga-
tion was exceptionally brief and the form of 
interrogation, on which ''Utah courts have 
placed a great deal of emphasis," id., was 
merely investigatory and in no sense accusa-
tory. See id. The question asked of defendant 
was merely part of a preliminary attempt to 
ascertain exactly that which was asked--
"What's going on?" Fifth, while defendant 
had not come to the place of questioning 
voluntarily, he had also not been taken there 
by police against his will-he was chased 
there by citizens trying to apprehend him. *f-
While the fifth factor might be taken as 
"relatively ^neutral,'", id., each of the\other 
factors are not suggestive of custody. Taken 
together, the factors compel the conclusion 
that defendant was not subject to custodial 
interrogation and no Miranda warning was 
required.5 See also State v. Kelly, 718 P.2d 
385, 391 (Utah 1986) (brief questioning inside 
warning upon asking investigatory question). 
HEARSAY & LIMITATION OF CROSS^ , 
EXAMINATION '; 
Defendant claims that the court's limitation 
of cross-examination of Moor and
 t the 
admission of certain hearsay testimony was 
erroneous.6 We review evidentiary rulings for 
a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Brown, 
771 P.2d 1093, 1094 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
On direct examination, Moor testified he 
had never seen defendant at a party. On cross-
examination Moor conceded that he had att-
ended parties of which he thereafter did not 
have complete recollection. Defense counsel 
asked if Moor's memory deficiency might be 
related to drug or alcohol use and whether it 
was possible that Moor had met defendant at 
such a party and did not recall the encounter 
because of the influence of alcohol or drugs. 
The court sustained the prosecution's object-
ions to both questions. 
Defendant had the right to impeach Moor's 
credibility by attacking his memory. Utah R. 
Evid. 607. Even though this right is limited by 
the witness's right to be free from harassment 
and humiliation, State v. Chesnut, 621 P.2d 
1228, 1233 (Utah 1980), defendant must be 
allowed to elicit testimony concerning a 
witness's ability to recall the event about 
which the witness is testifying. Moor's poss-
ible alcohol and drug use and any impact on 
his memory were relevant to the credibility of 
his testimony refuting defendants claimed 
defense of debt collection growing out of prior 
dealings with Moor. Consequently, it was 
error for the court to prevent testimony which 
probed Moor's possible inability to remember 
the party at which defendant claimed to have 
met him and to have sold him drugs for which 
Moor was to pay defendant later. • •;" ' 
Defendant also challenges a detective's 
testimony concerning the telephone locations 
from which pizza orders were made and the 
telephone numbers left with the order taker. 
The detective testified that in both the robbery 
at issue and the prior robbery, the number left 
did not correspond to the pay telephone from 
which the call had been made, although^in 
both instances the numbers were merely rear-
ranged. Defendant claims this testimony^was 
improper hearsay. » • , ^oi:z[ 
The state claims^ the business records^and 
public records exceptions of Utah Rule of 
Evidence 803 allow admission of the'officer's 
testimony. See Utah R. Evid. 803(6)^(8). 
However, the police Teport, and not the busi-
ness record of the pizza company, was the 
source to which the officer referred in his 
testimony. Police reports are not eligible for 
admission under either of these provisions of 
Rnlp 803 pyppnt in pertain limited circumsta-
1184-86 (Utah 1983). 
We need not determine, however, whether 
the court's errors in limiting cross-
examination of Moor and permitting the det-
ective's hearsay testimony rise to the level of a 
clear abuse of discretion. Any error in either 
instance was harmless and would not entitle 
defendant to reversal. See State v. Tillman, 
750 P.2d 546, 555 (Utah 1987). 
Concerning the limitations on cross-
examination, defendant was allowed to present 
his defense of debt collection stemming from 
an alleged marijuana sale to Moor. The jury 
learned that defendant claimed Moor used 
illegal drugs and had heard Moor admit that 
he had been to parties of which he later had 
no memory. While defendant should have 
been allowed to pursue questioning of Moor's 
memory ability, defendant established the 
important point that Moor's memory of 
parties was imperfect, a matter the jury was 
free to consider in deciding Moor's credibility. 
The exact reason for this deficiency was much 
less important. 
Concerning the telephone testimony, the 
facts of defendant's prior robbery were pro-
perly introduced through the testimony of the 
victim in that incident. Defendant also admi-
tted his participation in that robbery. The 
precise methodology of telephone usage in 
both instances was therefore comparatively 
inconsequential to the outcome. 
Viewing the other substantial evidence sup-
porting defendant's conviction, we cannot say 
that defendant might not have been convicted 
without the officer's testimony concerning the 
telephone numbers or if the jury had learned 
more about the exact reason Moor had inco-
mplete recall of some parties he had attended. 
CONCLUSION 
While the trial court erred in admitting 
evidence of the prior robbery under Rule 609, 
the same evidence was properly admitted 
under Rule 404(b). Defendant was not subje-
cted to custodial interrogation, and therefore 
was not entitled to a Miranda warning. 
Finally, any error in admission of the officer's 
hearsay testimony concerning the phone 
numbers and the limitation on cross-
examination concerning Moor's prior drug or 
alcohol use was harmless. Defendant's conv-
iction is accordingly affirmed. 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
1. Defendant also raises a challenge under the 
Confrontation Clause, U.S. Const, amend. VI, 
accprtino that he was denied the constitutional right 
tion grounds. See State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29, 34 
(Utah) (failure to object precludes review of evide-
ntiary matters except in case of plain error), cerr. 
denied, 110 S.Ct. 62 (1989). 
2. The state argues, however, that the guilty plea 
should be treated as a conviction for purposes of 
Rule 609(a)(2), relying on Srare v. Delashmutt, 676 
P.2d 383, 384 (Utah 1983)(per curiam). In our view, 
Delashmutt has questionable value as precedent. 
Significant case law concerning the nature of guilty 
pleas has developed since Delashmutt which gives 
doubt to its continued vitality. See, e.g., State v. 
Gallegos, 738 P.2d 1040 (Utah 1987); State v. Kayf 
717 P.2d 1294, 1303-5 (Utah 1986). Defendant had 
merely entered his plea on the other charge, and had 
neither been adjudged guilty nor sentenced by the 
court. In view of the liberality with which motions 
to withdraw guilty pleas are to be granted prior to 
sentence, see, e.g., Gallegos, 738 P.2d at 1042 
("presentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea 
should, in general, be liberally granted"), we see real 
difficulty, for Rule 609(a)(2) purposes, in equating a 
mere guilty plea, prior to sentencing, with an actual 
conviction. As explained hereafter, however, we 
need not definitively decide this issue since any error 
in admission of the guilty plea under Rule 609 was 
harmless in view of the admissibility of other evid-
ence of the crime under Rule 404(b). 
3. Convictions not admissible under Rule 609(a)(2) 
may yet be admissible under subsection (a)(1), which 
provides for admission of prior convictions where 
the court determines that the probative value outw-
eighs the prejudicial effect. The court must inquire 
into the probative value of the facts supporting the 
conviction and balance them against potential prej-
udice. State v. Banner, 111 P.2d 1325, 1334 (Utah 
1986). In Banner, the Supreme Court listed five 
factors to be considered. Id. The trial court in this 
case did not consider the Banner factors and we 
therefore do not decide whether the guilty plea 
could have been admitted under Rule 609(a)(1). Nor 
did the state argue that defendant's particular brand 
of robbery—characterized by false statements 
concerning his telephone number, his whereabouts, 
and his desire to obtain and pay for pizza-had 
sufficient bearing on his propensity to tell the truth 
to distinguish his crime from garden-variety theft 
so as to permit the evidence to come in under either 
Rule 609(a)(2) or 609(a)(1). 
4. Defendant was convicted of simple robbery under 
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-301 (1990), manifesting 
that the jury did not find he used or threatened the 
use of a dangerous weapon. The jury apparently 
concluded that the object defendant pressed against 
Moor was only a plastic nametag. 
5. In view of our disposition, we need not consider 
the state's alternative argument that, in any event, 
defendant's silence was admissible to impeach a 
defense offered for the first time at trial. See Flet-
cher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603, 605-607 (1982). But see 
People v. Jacobs, 158 Cal. App. 3d 740, 750, 
204 Cal. Rptr. 849, 856 (1984) (rejecting Fletcher v. 
Weir analysis under state constitutional provision 
nearly identical to federal counterpart); State v. 
Davis, 38 Wash. App. 600, 686 P.2d 1143, 1145-46 
(1984) (rejecting Fletcher v. Weir analysis under 
state constitutional provision identical to federal 
*—„^v. \/*/cr»n v State. 691 P.2d 1056, 1059-
the court's decisions in these respects can be susta-
ined under the Utah Rules of Evidence, his right to 
confrontation was nonetheless denied. See note 1, 
supra. 
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OPINION 
GARFF, Judge: 
Appellant, the Redevelopment Agency of 
Salt Lake City (RDA), seeks reversal of the 
district court's order granting partial summary 
judgment in favor of appellee Robert C. 
Nelson dba The Magazine Shop,1 and denying 
RDA's motion for partial summary judgment. 
In 1969, the Utah Legislature adopted the 
vi a^4., WHICH Lrcaies ana empowers municipal 
redevelopment agencies such as the RDA to 
acquire and redevelop property determined to 
be "blighted." See Redevelopment Agency of 
Salt Lake City v. Tanner, 740 P.2d 1296, 1297 
(Utah 1987). Pursuant to this act, Salt Lake 
City's Board of Commissioners (Commission) 
and, subsequently, its City Council, were 
designated to act as the city's redevelopment 
agency. Id. defendants Nelson, W & G 
Company, Broadway Music, J. Ross Trapp, 
National Department Store, and Downtown 
Athletic Club (Landowners), at the times rel-
evant to these events at issue in this case, were 
property owners having separate interests in 
properties on Block 57 in Salt Lake City. 
On February 4, 1971, the RDA adopted the 
Central Business District (CBD) V/est Neigh-
borhood Development Program, which incl-
uded two and one-half blocks of the down-
town Salt Lake City business district. In May 
1975, the RDA passed a resolution to consider 
the adoption of an ordinance amending the 
redevelopment plan to include an additional 
eleven blocks of the downtown business dist-
rict, including Block 57. In this resolution, the 
RDA designated this area as a redevelopment 
survey area, and decided that it required 
further study to determine whether one or 
more redevelopment projects within its boun-
daries were feasible. It directed the RDA staff 
to select one or more project areas comprising 
"all or part of the above described redevelo-
pment survey area," and to formulate a prel-
iminary redevelopment plan. 
To this end, the public hearings were held 
on the adoption of this ordinance on July 31 
and August 4, 1975 before the RDA, and on 
September 3, 1975 before the Commission. 
Although the RDA notified every property 
owner in the affected area by mail prior to the 
hearings, no Landowners attended these hea-
rings. 
During the hearings, the RDA's executive 
director, Michael Chitwood, assured those 
present that all owners of property designated 
for redevelopment by the RDA would be 
provided notice and hearing, along with det-
ailed architectural information about the ren-
ovation of their properties, and that property 
acquisition would not occur without their 
approval and consent. 
On September 10, 1975, the Commission 
passed an ordinance adopting the CBD West 
Neighborhood Development Plan and mailed a 
copy of the ordinance to every property owner 
in the affected area, including Landowners. 
On May 14, 1982, the RDA again notified 
all affected property owners, including Land-
owners, of another set of public hearings to be 
held for the purpose of amending and upda-
ting the CRD W**ct N i^oVihnrVir^ /i rk«™i~~ 
do not consider his related claim that even n 
urt's decisions in these respects can be susta-
nder the Utah Rules of Evidence, his right to 
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redevelopment agencies such as the RDA to 
acquire and redevelop property determined to 
be "blighted." See Redevelopment Agency of 
Salt Lake City v. Tanner, 740 P.2d 1296, 1297 
(Utah 1987). Pursuant to this act, Salt Lake 
City's Board of Commissioners (Commission) 
and, subsequently, its City Council, were 
designated to act as the city's redevelopment 
agency. Id. defendants Nelson, W & G 
Company, Broadway Music, J. Ross Trapp, 
National Department Store, and Downtown 
Athletic Club (Landowners), at the times rel-
evant to these events at issue in this case, were 
property owners having separate interests in 
properties on Block 57 in Salt Lake City. 
On February 4, 1971, the RDA adopted the 
Central Business District (CBD) West Neigh-
borhood Development Program, which incl-
uded two and one-half blocks of the down-
town Salt Lake City business district. In May 
1975, the RDA passed a resolution to consider 
the adoption of an ordinance amending the 
redevelopment plan to include an additional 
eleven blocks of the downtown business dist-
rict, including Block 57. In this resolution, the 
RDA designated this area as a redevelopment 
survey area, and decided that it required 
further study to determine whether one or 
more redevelopment projects within its boun-
daries were feasible. It directed the RDA staff 
to select one or more project areas comprising 
"all or part of the above described redevelo-
pment survey area," and to formulate a prel-
iminary redevelopment plan. 
To this end, the public hearings were held 
on the adoption of this ordinance on July 31 
and August 4, 1975 before the RDA, and on 
September 3, 1975 before the Commission. 
Although the RDA notified every property 
owner in the affected area by mail prior to the 
hearings, no Landowners attended these hea-
rings. 
During the hearings, the RDA's executive 
director, Michael Chitwood, assured those 
present that all owners of property designated 
for redevelopment by the RDA would be 
provided notice and hearing, along with det-
ailed architectural information about the ren-
ovation of their properties, and that property 
acquisition would not occur without their 
approval and consent. 
On September 10, 1975, the Commission 
passed an ordinance adopting the CBD West 
Neighborhood Development Plan and mailed a 
copy of the ordinance to every property owner 
in the affected area, including Landowners. 
On May 14, 1982, the RDA again notified 
all affected property owners, including Land-
owners, of another set of public hearings to be 
held for the purpose of amending and upda-
t e the CBD West Neighborhood Develop-
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THIS MATTER having come before the Court upon Appellant's 
Petition for Rehearing, filed January 9, 1991, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Appellant's Petition for 
Rehearing is denied. 
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